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I. Introduction
Ironically, the study globalization’s impact on the performance of labor markets
and labor market regulation has generated a new industry that has provided work to a
small army of researchers for more than a decade. 1 So it was with some trepidation that I
decided to join their ranks, even if only for a short tour of duty, especially in light of the
sharply contested positions held among these scholars who are drawn from a variety of
disciplines and come with sharply divergent normative commitments.
From the beginning of the free-trade era 2 one contentious area has been the
impact of trade liberalization on labor law. Opponents of NAFTA (and some supporters)
predicted a regulatory race to the bottom (RTB) would ensue leading to increasingly
deregulated labor markets. The result would be weaker collective bargaining laws, lower
minimum standards, and a decline in the social wage. In recent years a number of
scholars have examined the question in light of more than fifteen years experience under
CUFTA and ten under NAFTA and there seems to be a growing consensus that, contrary
1

A crude indicator of the growth of this industry can be gleaned from searches I

conducted on two electronic indexes (ASAP Academic – an interdisciplinary index - and the Index
to Legal Periodicals and Books) of the term “globalization and labo*r. From the beginning of
1980 (when both indexes begin) to the end of 1989 there were 4 (1+3) such references. From
1990 to December 6, 2004 there were 1484 (508+986). I will leave it to economically inclined
readers to decide whether the shift of resources into the globalization research industry has
increased aggregate welfare.
2

For the purposes of this paper, the free-trade era begins with the Canada-United States

Free Trade Agreement (entered into force 1 January 1989) (CUFTA), incorporated into the North
American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the Government of Mexico
and the Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2, I.L.M. 289
(entered into force 1 January 1994)(NAFTA). Hereinafter I will just refer to NAFTA unless
CUFTA is being discussed separately.

1

to those ‘great expectations’, labor laws in North America have not been significantly
weakened. 3
In this article, I re-examine the effects of NAFTA on collective bargaining law in
Canada and the United States. The restriction of my focus to collective bargaining is
prudential. In principle a proper assessment of NAFTA’s effects should encompass all
the strands of labor market regulation, but that is too large a project for an article. The
decision to exclude Mexico from this analysis was partly prudential, but also based on the
fact that its legal traditions, labor market organizations and institutional arrangements are
very different from those prevailing in Canada and the United States, complicating the
comparison.
My contribution to the debates comes down to two points. On the one hand, I
argue that the emerging consensus understates the impact of NAFTA-style trade
liberalization on the legal regulation of collective bargaining because its focus is
artificially narrow. In reaching their conclusions, ‘new consensus’ scholars have looked
exclusively at changes in private sector collective bargaining legislation. I argue this
produces a misleading picture of the impact of trade liberalization because it omits public

3

For a review of the literature, see Kevin Banks, “Globalization and Labour Standards –

Second Look at the Evidence,” (2004) 29 Queen’s Law Journal 533 (Banks challenges emerging
consensus that globalization has no negative impact on labor standards). Also see Michel
Gauvin, Labour Legislation in Canada: Major Developments and Trends, 1989-2003 (Ottawa:
Labour Law Analysis, Strategic Policy and International Labour Affairs, Labour Program,
Human Resources and Development Canada, October 3, 2003); Parbudyal Singh, “NAFTA and
Labor: A Canadian Perspective,” (2002) Journal of Labor Research 433 (short review of changes
in Canadian labor laws and standards largely based on secondary sources from the mid-1990s);
Pierre Verge, “How Does Canadian Labour Law Fare in a Global Economy?,” (2000) 42 Journal
of Industrial Relations 275.
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sector collective bargaining and, even more importantly, it fails to consider the impact of
trade liberalization on the effectiveness of statutory collective bargaining schemes. If the
focus is broadened to include public sector bargaining and labor law’s effectiveness, then
one finds there has been more labor market deregulation than consensus scholars
acknowledge.
On the other hand, I accept that, even after broadening our analytical lens, the
downward trajectory of the collective bargaining regime has not been as steep as many
RTB theorists predicted. I argue that the model upon which this prediction was based
was overly structural and that a more nuanced one is needed. Such a model must better
take into account a range of factors that mediate the impact of NAFTA-style trade
liberalization on labor market regulation. These mediations occur at the economic level,
within the collective bargaining regime itself, and in the external environment that shapes
the direction of state action.
The paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this section, I address
some preliminary and methodological issues. In Part II, I present a simple model of the
race to the bottom and then suggest an alternative, more nuanced model of the impact of
trade liberalization on labor market regulation. In Part III, I use that model to explore
developments in the collective bargaining regimes of Canada and the United States. In
Part IV I offer some brief concluding observations.

3

From the time the idea of a Canada-US free trade agreement was first floated, its
affect on labor market regulation was hotly contested. 4 The debate had both an empirical
and a normative dimension. The empirical question was whether, under a free trade
agreement that left each party at liberty to change its domestic labor standards (including
collective bargaining laws, minimum standards laws, anti-discrimination law, workers’
compensation laws, occupational health and safety laws, and unemployment insurance),
labor markets would become less regulated. To greatly simplify, critics of the free trade
agreements embraced the RTB hypothesis. According to this view, as capital became
more mobile it would seek to produce in the lowest cost jurisdiction. Jurisdictions with
high labor standards would be threatened with the loss of investment and, therefore,
would be under pressure to cut back on them, while jurisdictions seeking to attract new
investment would be tempted to lower labor standards. The result would be regulatory
competition that would push labor standards lower, unless other forces could be
mobilized to counteract the downward pressure. At the very least, supporters of strong
labor standards would be put on the defensive, fighting to hold on to their past gains. 5
Although some supporters of free trade acknowledged that it would lead to less labor
market regulation, most supporters this claim, arguing variously that the prisoners’
4

These debates are reviewed by Brian A. Langille, “Canadian Labour Law Reform and

Free Trade,” (1991) 23 Ottawa Law Review 581, 592-608 and George W. Adams, “The U.S.Canada Free Trade Agreement and Collective Bargaining,” (1988) 14 Can.-U.S. Law Journal 41,
46-52.
5

For example, see Ian Robinson, “How Will the North American Free Trade Agreement

Affect Worker Rights in North America?,” in Maria Lorena Cook and Harry C. Katz, eds.,
Regional Integration and Industrial Relations in North America (Ithaca, NY: Institute of
Collective Bargaining, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell
University, 1994), 105-131.

4

dilemma scenario that underpins the RTB analysis did not apply, that progressive
competitiveness strategies could yield mutual gains for labor and capital, or that the
positive effect of free trade on economic development would promote upward
harmonization. 6
The normative dimension of the debate was launched from the implicit premise
that labor market regulation would be weakened under free trade. The question was
whether that would be an undesirable outcome. Again, to greatly simplify, for free trade
critics, the answer was clearly that weakened labor market regulation would be
undesirable since it would undermine labor law’s social justice objectives: worker
participation and voice achieved through collective bargaining would be undermined, as
would protection against low wages, long hours of work, discriminatory treatment,
unhealthy and unsafe working conditions, and the risk of income disruption due to injury,
illness or unemployment. Supporters of liberalized trade and regulatory competitiveness,
on the other hand, viewed the question through the lens of comparative advantage and
efficiency. If competition in product markets is a good thing, then so too is competition
among producers of regulatory policy. Jurisdictions may choose to have sub-optimal (eg.
unduly high) labor standards if that is the will of the electorate, but in a free-trade regime
they will have to bear more of its cost (lower investment), as capital exits to jurisdictions
with more favorable regulatory regimes. If the threat of capital flight induces voters in
otherwise pro-regulatory jurisdictions to choose more optimal (eg. lower) standards that
6

For a useful survey of the competing views, see Morely Gunderson, “Harmonization of

Labour Policies under Trade Liberalization,” (1998) 53 Relations Industrielles 24; Brian Langille,
“Competing Conceptions of Regulatory Competition in Debates on Trade Liberalization and
Labour Standards,” in William Bratton et al., eds., International Regulatory Competition and
Coordination (Oxford: Claredon, 1996), 479.
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give them a comparative advantage, then this is a good outcome. It is just another
dimension of achieving net welfare gains through trade based on comparative advantage.
Certainly right-wing think tanks that ardently support free trade routinely make the claim
that high labor standards, including minimum wage laws and collective bargaining laws,
negatively affect competitiveness and, therefore, should be reduced. 7
In this paper, my focus is on the empirical dimension of the debate rather than the
normative, but I want to make one observation on what the normative regulatory
competitiveness debate reveals about the goal of NAFTA-style trade liberalization: that
whatever else NAFTA may aim to accomplish, it is an “ambitious attempts to enlist
external markets to obtain political ends.” 8 Put somewhat differently, NAFTA should be
viewed as part and parcel of a larger neo-liberal political project that aims to alter the
balance of power between class forces and shift the role of the state from ameliorating the
dysfunctional consequences of markets through social democratic or Keynesian welfarist
policies to the promotion of global competitiveness. In this way, NAFTA creates a
“conditioning framework” that is intended to influence the policy choices of citizens and
government. 9

7

For example, see Jason Clemens and Mark Mullins, “Dangers in Rigid Labour Laws:

Ministers Propose Prescriptive Changes to Labour Market Regulation” Online at
http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/shared/readmore1.asp?sNav=ed&id=317 (critique of proposed labor
law reforms stating: “These labour reforms are being proposed despite competition from other
jurisdictions”).
8

Daniel Drache, “Dreaming Trade or Trading Dreams: The Limits of Trade Blocs,” in

William Bratton et al., eds., International Regulatory Competition and Coordination (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1996), 417 at 418.
9

Roberto Grinspun and Robert Kreklewitch, “Consolidating Neoliberal Reforms: Free

Trade as a Conditioning Framework,” (1994) 43 Studies in Political Economy 33.
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One final preliminary point is that it is difficult to make an overall assessment of
the trajectory of Canadian collective bargaining law because constitutional jurisdiction
over labor and employment has been held by the courts to rest primarily with the
provinces. 10 As a result, the federal government’s Canada Labour Code 11 applies to
about ten percent of the labor force, while the laws of the provinces or territories govern
the remaining ninety percent of Canadian workers. In theory it is possible to construct
numerical indices that reflect changes in each jurisdiction over a fifteen-year period and
then arrive at a quantitative national assessment of the trajectory of Canadian labor law. 12
I have adopted a different approach that is based on a qualitative assessment of changes
in Canada’s three largest jurisdictions -- Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec – which
contain about eighty percent of the labor force between them. Mention will be made of
developments in other Canadian jurisdictions as appropriate. There is less of a problem
with American labor law because of federal preemption in the area of private sector
collective bargaining. State and local law, however, largely governs public sector
collective bargaining, outside of the federal civil service.

II. Modeling NAFTA’s Impact
A. The Race to the Bottom Model
Figure 1 presents a model of the RTB hypothesis. Essentially, it predicts that
under trade liberalization a downward regulatory competition will be promoted because
10

Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider [1925] A.C. 396.

11

R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2.

12

For an ambitious attempt to create such indices, see Richard N. Block, et al., Labor

Standards in the United States and Canada (Kalamazoo: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research).
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of the interaction between its effects on the economy and on the institutions for regulating
the labor market. In terms of economic effects, the argument is that in liberalized trading
regimes capital and product mobility is increased. This is accomplished by the removal
of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and by guaranteeing the security of investor rights
against adverse state action. NAFTA clearly accomplished this result (at least in
principle) by phasing out remaining tariffs between the member countries and by
eliminating the need for various import licenses and other non-tariff barriers. As well, it
protects NAFTA investors by guaranteeing national treatment (treatment no less
favorable than that given to national investors), most-favored nation status (treatment no
less favorable than that given to foreign investors of a third country), and property rights
against expropriation or nationalization (or measures having equivalent effect). It also
creates an investor-state disputing process that permits NAFTA investors to bring
complaints to an international tribunal with binding arbitration powers. 13
The increased mobility of capital and products enhances competition between
employers who are forced to continually seek ways to produce more efficiently lest a
lower-cost producer displace them. Labor is one factor of production that will be
affected by this intensified competitive struggle. Employers in a more competitive
environment will seek to increase labor productivity by lowering unit labor costs. This
can be accomplished by reducing the cost of employing a given quantity of labor or by

13

Ian Robinson, “How Will the North American Free Trade Agreement Affect Worker

Rights in North America?,” in Maria Lorena Cook and Harry C. Katz, eds. Regional Integration
and Industrial Relations in North America (Ithaca NY: Institute of Collective Bargaining, N.Y.
State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1994), 105, 106-108.
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increasing the amount produced by that same quantity of labor, or, most likely, by some
combination of the two (lower labor costs/higher productivity).
Because capital is mobile, it will move to jurisdictions where it can produce most
efficiently. These choices will depend in part on the natural and infrastructural
advantages of different locations, but governments will also adopt measures to maximize
their attractiveness to existing and prospective investors. Strong, comprehensive, and
well-enforced labor standards will not be attractive, as studies have shown that many
employers and multinational buyers perceive that higher standards result in competitive
disadvantage. 14 States that have high standards, therefore, will be pressured by
employers to lower them, 15 while states that have weak labor standards will, at the very
least, be disinclined to improve them, and, at worst, be driven to reduce them even further
to meet the competition from states that are weakening theirs. Workers’ organizations
will be less able politically to resist labor market deregulation in this environment
because of the greater weight of market discipline on state action. As well, their ability to
organize and their economic leverage will be reduced by the threat of capital flight. 16
This model assumes that trade liberalization occurs within a particular
institutional framework, one in which regulatory authority over labor markets remains

14
15

eg. Elliot, Labor Standards.
For example, see Guylaine Valée and Jean Charest, “Globalization and the

Transformation of State Regulation of Labour: the Case of Recent Amendments to the Quebec
Collective Agreement Decrees Act,” (2001) 17 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law
and Industrial Relations 79
16

Kate Bronfenbrenner, “Uneasy terrain: The impact of Capital Mobility on Workers,

Wages, and Union Organizing,” (Washington DC: US Trade Deficit Review Commission,
Commissioned Research Paper, 2000).
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local while capital is free to move outside the regulation-producing jurisdiction. If
different institutional arrangements were created to coordinate the production of labor
market standards among jurisdictions, or to create a new global regulation-producing
authority then the regulatory competition would end, and the market for labor market
standards would cease to operate, or at least be constrained.
What, then, are the institutional arrangements made by NAFTA for labor market
regulation? NAFTA itself has little to say on social matters, except in the preamble
where the parties resolve to “create new employment opportunities and improve working
conditions and living standards in their respective territories” and to “protect, enhance,
and enforce basic workers’ rights.” 17 These are not, however, enforceable obligations.
For this we must turn to the North American Accord on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), 18
or labor side accord, concluded after NAFTA was signed to fulfill an election promise
made by Bill Clinton that such an accord was a prerequisite to U.S. ratification. 19
NAALC sets out eleven guiding principles that each of the three signatories undertake to
promote, subject to each party’s domestic law.

1. freedom of association and protection of the right to organize
17

NAFTA, Preamble, available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org

18

NAALC, available at http://www.naalc.org/.

19

On the background to the negotiation of the NAALC, see Kate E. Andrias, “Gender,

Work, and the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement,” (2003) 37 San Francisco Law Review 521, 53043; Rainer Dombois, Erhard Hornberger & Jens Winter, “Transnational Labor Regulation in the
NAFTA – A Problem of Institutional Design? The Case of the North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation between the USA, Mexico and Canada,” (2003) 19 International Journal of
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 421, 425-28; John R. MacArthur, The Selling
of “Free Trade”: NAFTA, Washington, and the Subversion of American Democracy (New York:
Hill and Wang, 2000).
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2. the right to bargain collectively
3. the right to strike
4. prohibition of forced labor
5. limitation of child labor
6. minimum wage, hours of work an other labor standards
7. elimination of employment discrimination
8. equal pay for women and men
9. occupational health and safety
10. workers’ compensation
11. migrant worker protection
In addition to setting out principles, the accord requires each government to comply
with and enforce its own labor laws. It establishes the Commission on Labor
Cooperation, which is mandated to promote cooperative activities aimed at advancing the
goals of the NAALC, but is not given enforcement powers. For this purpose, the
NAALC requires each signatory to appoint a National Administrative Office (NAO) and
provides that a complaint alleging that a country is failing to enforce its own laws can be
filed with the NAO of another country. If the complaint is accepted, an investigation is
conducted and if the NAO finds that the laws are not being enforced, it may request
ministerial consultations. If the complaint is not resolved at this level, and does not
involve freedom of association, the right to bargain or the right to strike, then it may be
referred to an Evaluation Committee of Experts. Only complaints regarding occupational
health and safety, child labor, or minimum wages laws can go before an arbitration panel
vested with power to impose penalties for enforcement failures.
As many commentators have noted, while the NAALC expresses a commitment
to a set basic labor rights, it does not actually require the parties to amend their own laws
into order to implement them. Rather, it simply requires the parties to enforce the laws
they have. In marked contrast to the trade-related provisions of NAFTA, which give
investor rights priority over state sovereignty, the NAALC gives national sovereignty

11

priority over labor rights. Each party retains the “right to establish its own domestic labor
standards, and to adopt or modify accordingly it labor laws and regulations.” 20
These constitutive arrangements create the conditions for regulatory competition
described in Model 1: at the economic level, increased capital and product mobility
generate more intense competition which gives capital greater economic leverage over
labor; at the institutional level, labor standards are set nationally or sub-nationally,
depending on the constitutional arrangements of each of the signatories, but not at a
transnational level that coincides with the boundaries of capital and product markets.
Moreover, mechanisms to encourage each jurisdiction to enhance, protect, or even
enforce workers’ rights are weak.
It should be added that according to this model pressure would be greater on those
states and jurisdictions with higher labor standards and most dependent on trade. A
recent study created a quantitative index of labor standards in the United States and
Canada. As most observers would have predicted, it found that overall Canada had
higher labor standards than the United States. Of particular interest for our purposes is
that the study rated Canada’s collective bargaining laws as significantly stronger than
those of the U.S. Indeed, the gap between the United States and Canada on this measure
was among the largest identified by the study. 21 Further, Canada is the most trade
dependent of the OECD countries. Its exports as a percentage of gross national product
20

NAALC, Article 2. Clyde Summers, “NAFTA’s Labor Side Agreement and

International Labor Standards,” (1999) 3 Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 173;
Emmanuelle Mazuyer, “Labor Regulation in the North American Free Trade Area: A Study of
the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation,” (2001) 22 Comparative Labor Law &
Policy Journal 239, 245.
21

Block, Labor Standards, 95 (the comparison year was 1998).
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in 1995 was 33.5 while that of the United States was 8. The OECD average was 23.1
percent. 22 As a result, this model would predict that the pressure on Canadian collective
bargaining law would be particularly sharp.

22

Neil Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

2001), 203.
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Economic Effects
Capital and Product Mobility
Increased Competition
Bargaining Leverage of Capital Increased

Regulatory Competition

NAFTA-style Trade
Liberalization

State

Lower Legislated
Labor Standards

Institutional Effects
Labor Market Regulation Remains
Local
Weak Coordination Mechanisms

Figure 1
Model of the Race to the Bottom Theory
B. The RTB Model’s Limitations
Recent literature examining the impact liberalized trading regimes on regulation,
even in institutional contexts that foster regulatory competition, suggests that races to the
bottom do not necessarily follow and that a variety of politico-economic processes
contribute to regulatory outcomes. 23 Some studies have illustrated this point through an
examination of an analogous situation, labor market regulation in federal states. A brief
comparison of the United States and Canada, two federal states with very different
constitutional divisions of powers over labor and employment law, is suggestive.
In the United States, the courts held that the federal government’s National Labor
Relations Act 24 substantially pre-empted state jurisdiction, thereby limiting the
opportunity for regulatory competition between states to occur. This was partially
23

For example, see the essays collected in Daniel C. Esty and Damien Geradin, eds.,

Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration (New York: Oxford UP, 2001).
24

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); National Labor Relations

(Wagner) Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449.
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undone by the Taft-Hartley Act, 25 which permitted states to enact “right-to-work” laws
that weakened union security. A number of states exercised this power, particularly in
the southern US. That change, in conjunction with fierce employer resistance to
unionization, racism and disunity in low union densities in southern states. 26
Although the spread of right to work laws slowed in the 1960s, their significance
grew as employers became more aggressive in pursuing non-union production strategies.
One way to achieve that result was to shift investment to greenfield sites, often located in
right-to-work states. These trends intensified in the 1980s, when northern and midwestern states lost 1.5 million manufacturing jobs and $40 billion in pay, largely to rightto-work states. 27 Internal regulatory competition, however, cannot be invoked as the
principal reason for the weakness of U.S. labor law. Barenberg emphasizes other factors,
including decentralized competition, ineffective coordination mechanisms, and the role of
local state law. Decentralized competition occurred because of the extremely fragmented
bargaining structure that was institutionalized under the NLRA and because employers
were free to divest from unionized plants and reinvest in non-union ones. Coordinating
mechanisms that might have overcome this fragmentation (such as peak union and
employer associations, national political parties, etc) were too weak to play this role.
Finally, local elites, particularly in the south, were able to mobilize state and local power

25

Labor-Management Relations (Taft Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).

26

Michael Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights (Urbana, IL: University of

Illinois Press, 1993).
27

Thomas A. Kochan, Harry C. Katz, and Robert B. McKersie, The Transformation of

American Industrial Relations (Ithaca: ILR Press, 1994); Rick Fantasia and Kim Voss, Hard
Work (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 74-75.
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to defeat the exercise of federally guaranteed core labor rights. 28 The result was a
centralized but ineffective legal regime.
Canada presents an interesting comparison. As mentioned, courts have held that
federal jurisdiction over labor and employment is very limited, leaving regulatory
authority vested in the provinces. This constitutional arrangement favors regulatory
competition, since capital is fairly free to move between provinces. Yet, there has not
been a race to the bottom. For example, within a few years after the federal
government’s industrial relations legislation was struck down in1925, nearly all the
provinces passed laws either opting into it or creating parallel mechanisms of their own.
During World War II the federal government’s powers expanded under emergency
legislation and it introduced U.S. style collective bargaining law to Canada. However,
after the war’s end and the resumption by the provinces of their normal authority, with a
few years, all provinces adopted a version of that scheme. 29 Perhaps for this reason, the
effect of federalism on the development of Canadian labor law has not received much
scholarly attention. In his book Reconcilable Differences Paul Weiler briefly argues that
the provinces have served as “laboratories for legal experimentation” that generally led to

28

Mark Barenberg, “Labor Federalism in the United States: Lessons for Coordinated

Decentralization in Supranational Regimes,” in Esty and Gerdin, Regulatory Competition and
Economic Integration. Also see Bruce Elmslie and William Milberg, “Free Trade and Social
Dumping: Lessons from the Regulation of Interstate Commerce,” (May-June 1996) Challenge 46
(arguing that the federal Fair Labor Standards Act eliminated socially destructive regulatory
competition over child labor laws) and Lane Kenworthy, “Economic Integration and
Convergence: A Look at the U.S. States,” (1999) 80 Social Science Quarterly 858 (arguing
economic integration and regulatory competition has not led to harmonization, citing the limited
spread of right-to-work laws as one example).
29

Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law (Toronto: Oxford, 2001).
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positive innovation. The reason for this, he suggests, was that in large provinces, like
Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia, plant location decisions are largely driven by
other factors such as the availability of raw materials, transportation costs, access to
markets, etc, and that variation in labor law pales by comparison. 30 To my knowledge,
no one has argued that regulatory competition has exerted a significant downward
influence on labor law and employment standards in Canada. 31
The simple lesson to be learned from this brief comparison is that a regime that
creates the structural conditions for regulatory competition may still have strong labor
laws, while a more centralized regime may not. The structural scope for regulatory
competition within federal states is only one factor that determines the trajectory of labor
law. The same lesson has been applied to international and regional free trade
arrangements. Indeed, as noted earlier, there seems to be an emerging consensus that the
structural possibilities for regulatory competition opened up by NAFTA and similar kinds
of trade agreements have not produced races to the bottom in the area of labor law.

C. Moving the Debate Forward: Towards a Reconstructed Model of Trade
Liberalization’s Effect on Labor Market Regulation

30

Paul Weiler, Reconcilable Differences (Toronto: Carswell, 1980), 11.

31

F.R. Scott, Essays on the Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977),

ch. 25, argued that divided jurisdiction over labor relations was undesirable because it interfered
with the ability of unions to bargain collectively with employers who operated nationally. He did
not argue that provincial jurisdiction was promoting a regulatory race to the bottom in labor
standards.
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The critics of the RTB model presented in Figure 1 make a strong case that it
oversimplifies the effect of NAFTA-style trade liberalization on labor law. In this part of
the paper I respond to that criticism in two ways. On the one hand, I argue that their
assessment of NAFTA’s impact is based on an artificially narrow focus on private sector
labor legislation. Not only does this leave out public sector collective bargaining law but,
more importantly, it fails to consider NAFTA’s impact on the effectiveness of the
collective bargaining regime. This results in an understatement of the NAFTA effect.
On the other hand, I accept that a more nuanced, less structural model is needed that other
factors need to be brought in to explain regulatory outcomes. I identify and build into a
revised model some mediating contextual factors that allow a greater role for agency and
contingency.

1. From Private Sector Labor Legislation to the Effectiveness of Labor Market
Regulation
The argument that NAFTA has not promoted a RTB is based on an examination
of private sector labor legislation. Its use as a measure is appealing if only because
legislative changes are relatively easy to track and assess. This focus, however, misses
what are arguably some of NAFTA’s more important effects.
First, it ignores developments in public sector collective bargaining, presumably
on the assumption, unstated in the literature, that changes in that area are unrelated to
globalization. That assumption, however, is problematic. A number of commentators
have pointed to links between globalization and government fiscal and tax policies,
reductions in government services, and privatization, all major causes of the harsher

18

public-sector collective bargaining climate that has led to legislative retrenchment. 32
Belman et al expressly spell out these links.

With greater global competition and reduced tariff barriers it is easier for
capital to flow into countries with low taxes and few regulations and to
export into high-cost countries. Governments are under increased pressure
to compete for business investment and the associated jobs, and this
interjurisdictional competition may occur in the form of tax reductions and
reduced regulations. The tax reductions directly affect the public sector
budget constraints and employment relations, especially given the
importance of labor cost in the provision of many public services.
Reduced regulation indirectly reduces the demand for government
services, since such regulation was often provide through the public
sector. 33
It is also important to emphasize that in both Canada and the United States,
collective bargaining is becoming a mechanism that is primarily used to establish terms
and conditions of employment in the public sector. Union density in the private sector in
Canada has dropped below twenty percent, while public sector union density is above
seventy-five percent. In the United States, private sector unionism has dropped below

32

Joseph B. Rose, Gary N. Chaison and Enrique de la Garza, “A Comparative Analysis

of Public Sector Restructuring in the U.S., Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean,” (2000) 21
Journal of Labor Studies 601 (increased global competition, trade liberalization, and deregulation
exerting tremendous pressure on public sector); Gene Swimmer, “Public-Sector Labour Relations
in an Era of Restraint and Restructuring: An Overview,” in Gene Swimmer, ed., .Public-Sector
Labour Relations in an Era of Restraint and Restructuring (Toronto: Oxford University Press,
2001), 1, 8 (governments in a globalized economy fear tax increases and regulation will lead to be
unattractive to capital).
33

Dale Belman, Morley Gunderson and Douglas Hyatt, “Public Sector Employment

Relations in Transition,” in Dale Belman et al., eds., Public Sector Employment in a Time of
Transition (Madison: Industrial Relations Research Association , 1996), 4-5.
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nine percent, while public sector unionism is at thirty-seven percent. 34 Hence an
exclusive focus on private sector collective bargaining law yields a very distorted picture
of the world of collective bargaining.
Moreover, by focusing narrowly on legislation, researchers fail to consider what
is arguably a more important outcome, the impact of trade liberalization on the
effectiveness of labor market regulation. The reasons why we ought to be concerned
with regulatory effectiveness are fairly obvious. Decades of law and society scholarship
have emphasized that there is often a huge gap between law on the books and the law in
action. While law on the books may have a certain expressive or symbolic value, if it
fails instrumentally to achieve its objectives then there has been regulatory failure and the
putative beneficiaries of the law are deprived of it promise. In short, we would get a very
distorted view of reality if we were to rely solely on legislative change as a measure of
the impact of trade liberalization on labor law. 35 For these reasons the focus of a
reconstructed model is on the effectiveness of labor market regulation
Changes in the effectiveness of labor market regulation can come about in a
number of ways. First, labor legislation may be intentionally changed to reduce its
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effectiveness. This can be thought of as direct deregulation of labor markets and is a
policy goal that is frequently advocated by those who believe existing levels or forms of
state regulation are harmful to the economy. 36 There may also be cases where legislative
change has the unintended effect of making labor market regulation less effective.
A second way that labor law can become less effective in through legislative
inaction in the context of a rapidly changing labor market. This constitutes what has been
characterized as passive deregulation. 37 An obvious example is that the value of certain
labor standards, like the minimum wage, erodes over time due to inflation. Inaction
renders the scheme of regulation less effective in achieving its goal of protecting workers
against socially unacceptable levels of low pay. Another example is the development of
structural mismatches between static schemes of labor market regulation and changes in
the labor markets to which they apply. This is particularly salient in the context of trade
liberalization, which has promoted employers to pursue a variety of flexibilization
strategies. For example, much has been written about the growth of contingent or
precarious employment and the problems it creates for current modes of labor regulation
that were constructed on the platform of the standard employment relation. 38 Yet, little
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has been done to revamp labor law to meet this challenge. Similarly, a central premise of
Canadian and U.S. labor law is that collective bargaining should occur at the enterprise
level. This arrangement has always presented a challenge for unions, especially outside
oligopolistic sectors of the economy where employers resisted joint regulation with
unions to take wages out of competition. Trade liberalization has exacerbated the
coordination problem and, as result, pattern bargaining has broken down and there is
greater wage competition within the unionized workforce. 39 Again, in these
circumstances it is arguable that legislative inaction reduces the effectiveness of labor
market regulation – a form of passive deregulation.
A third way of altering the effectiveness of existing labor law is by administrative
means. Changes in the way the administrative bodies interpret and enforce the law can
significantly alter its effectiveness. These administrative changes are much less visible
than legislation, and sometime will be referred to as disguised or hidden deregulation.
Their effects, however, can be just as great as those made directly by legislation. For
example, a change in the interpretation of the meaning of the term “employee” could
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significantly alter the scope of the law’s application. 40 Of course, the extent of
administrative authority or discretion may vary significantly from scheme to scheme, but
often there is usually a fair bit of leeway. To the extent that courts play a role in
supervising an administrative body’s interpretation of law or exercise of discretion, they
too become implicated in the administration of the law and the effect of their
interventions on regulatory effectiveness must also be considered.
Administrative deregulation can also occur through the enforcement process. 41 A
reduction in the resources available for enforcement or a change in the enforcement
strategy can greatly alter the regime’s effectiveness and its impact on labor costs. For
example, strong occupational health and safety laws can be rendered ineffective without
weakening employers’ substantive duties by a reduction in the enforcement budget or by
a decision to rely exclusively on persuasive strategies even after they have failed to alter
an employers’ behavior. 42 NAALC’s focus on the enforcement of existing labor laws
treats this method of hidden deregulation is “illegitimate.”
Finally, changes in the labor market that deter employees from exercising or
asserting their legal rights also impair the regime’s effectiveness. Fear of retaliation or
concern that an employer will simply close up shop if forced to comply with the law is a
40
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powerful disincentive for employees, whether they are contemplating joining a union,
complaining about illegally low wages, or calling a health and safety inspector. 43
A switch in focus from legislation to regulatory effectiveness creates significant
methodological problems, since it is much more difficult to identify and estimate changes
in effectiveness. There is a rich literature on the effects of globalization on labor
markets, 44 which is largely unconnected to the literature addressing labor market
regulation. While the two questions should not be collapsed into one, an assessment of
regulatory effectiveness will necessarily have to consider labor market changes, both for
the purpose of discussing mismatches between regulatory arrangements and labor market
realities and for data that is indicative of regulatory failure.

2. Bringing in Contextual Factors
In modeling the impact of NAFTA on labor regulation, it is useful to identify two
levels of determination: the structural and the politico-economic. I have already argued
that NAFTA is intended to establish a conditioning framework within which capital,
labor and government operate. In that way, it operates at the structural level of
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determination and Model 1 captures its key elements. But, even after a set of constitutive
decisions has been made, there are many mediating factors that will influence regulatory
outcomes. For example, Gunderson hypothesizes that for trade liberalization to promote
downward harmonization four linkages must exist: 1) the laws in question must be
enforced; 2) the laws must lead to an actual or perceived increase in labor costs to
employers; 3) higher labor costs deter investment and influence plant location; and 4)
jurisdictions must compete for investment on the basis of reducing costly labor laws. 45
This is a useful beginning, but I propose to elaborate a more general model that identifies
three sets of mediating variables involving: economic complexity; internal adaptation in
the collective bargaining scheme; and the external political, legal, ideological, and social
environment that shapes government policy. 46
There are three disputes in the economics literature that potentially complicate the
relationship between trade liberalization and labor law. The first is a dispute over the
magnitude of the changes in world trade that are associated with globalization and trade
liberalization. For example, Fligstein shows that as a percentage of world GDP, world
trade grew steadily from 1953 until it peaked in 1981, but that over the next sixteen years
it fluctuated. He concludes that, viewed over the longer term, world trade is not
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overwhelming national economies. 47 It is, however, undoubtedly the case that since the
beginning of the free-trade era, there has been a phenomenal growth in trade between the
U.S. and Canada, more than doubling between 1985 and 2002. 48
A second dispute is over the relative significance of labor costs in investment
decisions. It has been argued that that even under conditions of competition, location
decisions are driven by a variety of considerations, and that while local labor costs and
the strength of local labor market regulation are factors, they are not necessarily the most
important ones. Indeed, some studies suggest that labor standards play a relatively minor
role in location decisions compared to factors such as the availability of natural resources,
transportation costs, tax considerations, and market size. 49 Other studies, however, show
that higher wage costs are associated with lower employment growth in labor-intensive
industries. 50
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A third dispute is over the optimality of a low-wage, low-standards economic
strategy. It has been argued that lower labor standards may not be as advantageous as
RTB supporters assume. For example, Kucera’s study concludes that lower labor
standards do not improve competitiveness and that, to the contrary, higher labor standards
may be associated with other characteristics that make a jurisdiction attractive for
investors. 51 Other studies have reached similar conclusions and argue that there is no
empirical evidence to demonstrate that the low-wage, weak labor protection model of
economic growth is optimal. 52
No attempt will be made in this paper to sort out these disputes. Rather, the point
is simply that NAFTA’s economic effects are not as straightforward as the RTB model
assumes. Thus, while labor standards are part of the mix of considerations in the calculus
of location decisions, their salience is likely to depend on a number of factors that include
not only the macro-economic factors identified above, but also the degree of interjurisdictional disparity in standards, and industry or even employer specific production
regimes. As well, it is likely that some labor standards are more related to
competitiveness than others. For example, it seems plausible to assume that strong antidiscrimination laws are less likely to create or to be seen to create competitive
disadvantage than laws that strictly regulate hours of work.
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To the extent that NAFTA’s economic effects are more moderate than RTB
theorists assert, the degree of economic compulsion driving a race to the bottom is
reduced, leaving more room for states, firms, and unions to make strategic choices. This,
in turn, marginally lessens the pressure on collective bargaining regimes and opens up
spaces for political, legal, and civil society influences to operate.
A second point at which mediating factors operate is within the existing labor and
employment law regime, particularly through the mechanism of internal adaptation. Here
it is assumed that trade liberalization and regulatory competition generate pressure on
employers to increase output per unit of labor input, but that this pressure may be
addressed within the existing regulatory framework. To the extent that adjustment takes
place within the existing framework, labor market deregulation will be a lower priority
for employers. 53
Internal adaptation can occur on at least two levels. At the macro-level, collective
bargaining laws contained within themselves competing policy goals and visions. For
some, the goal of collective bargaining laws was to advance a vision of industrial
democracy in which workers and organized workers would jointly determine the rules
that would govern their joint endeavor. This vision assumed that collective bargaining
would continue within a capitalist economy, but it allowed for greater democracy on the
assumption that either such arrangements would increase productivity or that competitive
pressures would be alleviated by virtue of the spread of collective bargaining across
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industry. For others, collective bargaining was simply an alternative mechanism for
negotiating terms and conditions of employment that employees might opt into,
unconnected to any broader vision of how relations of production might be made more
consistent with democratic norms. The crucial point here is not which vision is
preferable, but that the same statutory regime could function either as a promoter of
industrial democracy or as an unadorned market mechanism depending on how it was
interpreted and, more importantly, on the institutional, ideological, and politicaleconomic environment in which it operates. To the extent that the more transformative
ambitions of collective bargaining are reined in, it is hypothesized that employers in a
NAFTA-style free-trade environment will find it less threatening. 54
A second or micro-level of internal adaptation is built into framework laws, like
labor relations acts, that establish a baseline of rights and a set of procedures through
which the specific parties establish and negotiate the substantive terms of their
relationship. Such a scheme is inherently adaptive insofar as it gives each party ample
leeway to pursue its agenda, leaving the outcome to the exercise of bargaining power in
the context of the market. This internal adjustment could take two forms. In the
optimistic view, which mirrors the industrial democracy perspective although now is less
explicitly linked to that agenda, unions and employers can take the high road on which
they negotiate win-win arrangements that create stronger firms more able to compete in
the global market, while providing workers with higher pay, more involvement and
greater job security. In this view, competitiveness can be pursued cooperatively and
progressively. The alternative is the low road, where management uses its leverage in the
54
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collective bargaining process to extract concessions and intensify work. In either event,
adjustment occurs, although winners and losers change. 55
Finally, the third set of mediating factors operates externally to the labor and
employment law regime potentially as constraints on the structural pressures generated
by trade liberalization. These constraints can operate through the political system, the
legal system, and civil society, and on different spatial (eg. national, international) levels.
Beginning with the political, it has been argued that nation states are still a crucial site of
resistance to globalization since social power is still rooted nationally. Indeed, it is
through the exercise of sovereign national power that liberalized trading regimes are
constructed. Thus, while these regimes may be designed with the aim of disciplining the
democratic political process, it is arguably still possible for workers and others who are
adversely affected to mobilize nationally and successfully constrain the neo-liberal
project, through institutionalized channels, such as participation in elections and formal
lobbying. 56 Indeed, there is a large literature emphasizing that states have responded to
the pressures of globalization in a variety of ways, reflecting the historical
institutionalization of class and of state-market relations, often distinguishing between
liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs). 57
55
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Arguably, then, the race to the bottom could be thwarted or slowed because national or
sub-national political resistance to the erosion of labor standards has been sufficient to
counter the downward pressure.
Political action is not just confined to the national sphere and, indeed, the
processes of globalization and trade liberalization have challenged social movements and
labor organizations to develop transnational political and organizing strategies. Jeffrey
Ayres has recently examined the development of what he calls “contentious
transnationalism” and finds there has been an increase in institutionalized political
activity facilitated by the NAALC complaints procedure and in non-institutionalized
activity such as cross-border campaigns focused on government action particularly in the
US-Mexico border region. 58 We will consider its effects in the context of international
legal and civil society constraints.
When we turn to legal restraints our focus is in on instruments that formally limit
the power of governments to reduce labor standards. At the national level, the clearest
instance would be constitutional protections of labor rights, such as freedom of
Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
(social democratic corporatism has successfully responded to the pressures of globalization and
offers a viable alternative); Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the
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association or guarantees of equality rights. The strength of this kind of constraint will
obviously vary from state to state and some labor rights will be better protected than
others. We will return to examine the respective constitutional rights of workers in
Canada and the United States in our case study.
At the international or transnational level, there is a wide range of instruments that
potentially limit state action. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has
historically been the most important body engaged in the construction of an international
labor rights regime through its declarations, conventions, and, most recently, its adoption
in 1998 of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. There is a
large literature assessing the ILO’s effectiveness but for our purposes here it is sufficient
to note that the ILO’s enforcement capacity is quite limited. 59 Nevertheless, the norms
generated by the ILO may influence domestic legal decision-making or may support
society constraints. Another potential source of international restraints is through the
inclusion of labor protections in multilateral or bilateral trade agreements. The issue of
protecting labor standards through the WTO has been much debated, but no action has
been taken, so this is a mere hypothetical. 60 Labor standards are addressed in the
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NAALC, but as noted it only requires states to enforce their laws, not to establish or
maintain a minimum set of labor standards. Nevertheless, the NAALC does support in
principle high labor standards and promotes them through the Commission for Labor
Cooperation. Thus, as in the case of the ILO, it is arguable that notwithstanding the
weakness of the mechanisms for implementation, the NAALC may influence decisionmaking by domestic courts and tribunals or, more generally, promote an ideological
climate that exerts a countervailing force to the pressures for lower labor standards. 61
Again, the question of the strength of these effects is an empirical one and will be
examined in the context of the case study.
Finally, there may be ideological or civil society restraints on the erosion of labor
standards. The idea here is that if certain norms become sufficiently widespread
governments and transnational corporations will be constrained in efforts to pursue
competitiveness-enhancing and profit-maximizing strategies. Thus, for example,
Langille argues that the view that economic growth should be pursued independently of
social justice and human rights is increasing being challenged by Sen and others who
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argue that the promotion of human development should guide public policy. 62 As this
view gains popular support, governments will face greater political opposition to labor
market deregulation, particularly when it adversely affects the most vulnerable workers.
As well, the spread of a counter-hegemonic ideology may also promote the
growth of strong civil society groups whose activities constrain the behavior of
transnational corporations and governments. 63 Campaigns by NGOs and workers’ rights
advocacy groups to pressure transnational corporations into adopting codes of conduct
governing work conditions of suppliers are the most prominent manifestation of this
influence. 64 Another example is the campaign recently initiated by a consortium of AFLCIO unions to pressure Walmart into raising wages and improving conditions, not by
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organizing its employees, but by mobilizing public opinion. 65 Again, the question of the
extent and direction of an ideological shift, and the effectiveness of civil society
campaigns is an empirical one; here we are only concerned to identify factors that may
counteract pressures to reduce labor standards arising from regulatory competition in a
liberalized trading regime.
Thus to conclude, a more nuanced model of the effects of NAFTA-style trade
liberalization on labor standards must take into account a wide-range of variables. Figure
2 depicts such a model, incorporating the variables discussed above.
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Figure 2
Nuanced Model of the Impact of Trade Liberalization on
Labor Standards

III. Case Study: Collective Bargaining Law in Canada and the U.S.
Collective bargaining laws historically have been shaped by histories of struggle
between workers acting collectively to improve the terms and conditions of their
employment and to provide them with a means of participating in decision-making that
affects them as individuals and as a group, and employers seeking to contain labor costs,
limit intrusions on managerial prerogative and constrain industrial action. The
government becomes involved not as the neutral umpire, but with the goal of advancing
what it views to be the public interest at any given time. This may involve a variety of
goals such as promoting industrial democracy and the values associated with it,
maintaining the balance between production and domestic consumption, containing the
spillover effects of industrial conflict, supporting export-led growth, etc. As a result,
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labor law is likely to be sensitive to changes in the balance of power between labor and
capital and shifts in state policy. 66
According to our nuanced model, NAFTA-style trade liberalization is liable to
generate some degree of structural pressure on states to weaken labor market regulation
through direct legislation action, passivity in the face of changing labor markets, and
administrative changes. The actual impact of trade liberalization, however, will depend
on the kinds of mediating factors discussed above. The following case studies of Canada
and the U.S. each begin with an assessment of the trajectory of collective bargaining law.
This is followed by an examination of two of the three mediating factors, internal
adaptation and external constraints. No attempt will be made to assess the extent to
which, under liberalized trade, economic pressures are generating structural pressure to
reduce the effectiveness of the collective bargaining regime in each country. Rather, we
adopt the fairly mainstream economic view that while collective bargaining laws may not
be the most important factor influencing investment decisions, they are a consideration,
especially in competitions between jurisdictions that are at similar levels of development.
This is because, according to one recent survey, on average, union members receive
higher wages, higher union densities are associated with higher wage mark-ups, and net
company profits tend to be lower in unionized firms than in non-unionized firms. 67 In
the absence of offsetting benefits, the lower cost jurisdiction will be preferred. The
implication of this starting position, then, is that while NAFTA-style trade regimes
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promote some downward pressure on the effectiveness of collective bargaining regimes,
there is scope for other factors to shape the outcome.

A. Canada
1. The Trajectory of Collective Bargaining Law
a. Legislative Change
i. Private Sector Collective Bargaining
Collective bargaining law in Ontario has been regularly amended since the
enactment of the first Wagner-Act style collective bargaining act in 1943, following a
pattern that has been characterized as cautious and pragmatic. 68 Typically, legislative
reforms came bundled in packages that made concessions to both union and employer
demands. For example, in 1980 the law was amended to require employers to deduct and
remit union dues for all bargaining unit members (known in Canada as the Rand
formula). In exchange, employers were empowered to force a ratification vote on their
most recent offer. 69
Labor law reform in the free-trade era has broken from this pattern. The New
Democratic Party (NDP) formed the government for the first time in 1990 and was under
pressure from its union supporters to amend the collective bargaining law. The
government hoped to achieve a union-management consensus but, after lengthy
consultations failed to yield a compromise, it introduced Bill 40 over the vociferous
68
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objections of employers. The bill was eventually passed after extended public hearings
and came into force on January 1, 1993. 70 The most significant changes included
expedited unfair labor proceedings, interim reinstatement of workers fired during an
organizing campaign, broader provision for first contract arbitration, better union access
to employees, a partial ban on replacement workers, extended job protection during
strikes, and a right to picket on some third-party property. Bill 40, however, was shortlived. The Progressive Conservative Party (PC) won a sweeping majority in 1995 and
one of its highest priorities was labor law reform. Bill 7 was passed without any
consultation or public hearings. Not only did it repeal the NDP reforms, but Bill 7 also
introduced its own innovations, the most important being an end to the card-based system
of certification (whereby unions could get certified by signing up 55% of the members of
the bargaining unit), mandating instead elections in every case. 71 This was followed by
another set of amendments in 1998, the most important of which was to strip the labour
board of its power to order remedial certifications in the event it found that unfair labor
practices prevented employees from expressing their true wishes in an election. 72 This
was followed two years later by Bill 139, which promoted union decertification. 73 More
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recently, a Liberal government was elected in 2003 and in the fall of 2004 it introduced
its own package of labor law reforms. If passed, the board’s power to order remedial
certification and to reinstate on an interim basis employees terminated during an
organizing campaign will be restored. Card certification, however, would not, except in
construction. 74
The history of labor law reform in British Columbia has followed a somewhat
different pattern, alternating between employer-driven reforms and ones emerging from
consultative processes. In 1987, prior to CUFTA, a conservative Social Credit
government pushed through a set of one-sided reforms that ended card count
certification, facilitated decertification, restricted picketing and boycotts, and empowered
the chair of the labour commission to intervene in trade disputes. According to the then
Labour Minister, Lyall Hanson, the twin goals of the law were “cost containment and
international competitiveness.” 75 A majority NDP government was elected in 1991 and it
established a bipartite labor-management consultation committee that produced a set of
consensus recommendations. The government accepted these recommendations,
including a return to card-based certifications. The parties could not reach a consensus
on three issues and the government crafted a set of compromises. It banned replacement
workers, retained most of the restrictions on picketing, and declined to implement a
broader-based bargaining scheme for traditionally non-union sectors. In 1998 it enacted
another set of reforms, the most important of which established sectoral bargaining for
the construction industry. In 2001 a right-leaning Liberal government was elected and it
74
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promptly repealed the sectoral bargaining provision and restored mandatory voting for all
certifications, but retained the ban on replacement workers. 76
Quebec entered the free-trade era with one of the more progressive private sector
collective bargaining laws, having been the first province to ban replacement workers and
make dues deductions mandatory. It also had a decree law that allowed the minister of
labour to extend the application of a collective agreement to all firms, union and nonunion, that were in the same industrial and geographic sector. Since the free-trade era,
there have been relatively few changes to the basic collective bargaining law and they
have largely aimed to strengthen it. In 1994 the three-year maximum term was
eliminated (except for first agreements) and in 2001 a more extensive set of amendments
streamlined the administration of the code, better protected individual and union rights in
cases of contracting out, and provided for forced ratification votes. On the other hand,
the decree system has been weakened over the same period. In 1996 the act was
amended to require a ministerial review of all decrees prior to their renewal to determine
whether the decree impairs the competitiveness of the affected industries with enterprises
outside of Quebec. In the years since this change, nearly a third of all decrees were not
renewed, almost all covering manufacturing industries. By 2000, 73% of manufacturing
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employers and 60% of manufacturing employees formerly covered by decrees were now
excluded. 77
Changes in a number of other Canadian jurisdictions reflect the unevenness
observed in the three largest provinces. NDP governments in Manitoba and
Saskatchewan, and a Liberal government in Ottawa have strengthened their private sector
collective bargaining laws in various ways. On the one hand, there has been a shift away
from card-count certifications to mandatory votes. Prior to the free-trade era only one
province required votes. Since 1988 the number has increased to five (Nova Scotia,
Alberta, Newfoundland and Labrador, Ontario, and British Columbia), covering about
two-thirds of the labor force. 78
Most commentators have concluded that Canadian private sector labor law has
remained relatively stable in the free-trade era.79 While I do not fundamentally disagree
with these judgments, they fail to give proper weight to the most significant overall
change – the move to mandatory voting to establish majority support for union
representation. Numerous studies have found that the shift from card counts to elections
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significantly reduces union success rates and lead to a lowering of trade union density. 80
As a result, the negative effect of this change likely outweighs the positive effect of other
changes.

ii. Public Sector Collective Bargaining
The picture changes dramatically if we expand our horizons to include public
sector collective bargaining. Public sector collective bargaining was accepted in Canada
in the mid-1960s to early 1970s and has always differed in some respects from the private
sector model, particularly with respect to dispute resolution. Strikes and lockouts were
often prohibited and instead binding interest arbitration was used to resolve bargaining
impasses. Public sector union density rose rapidly, far exceeding that of the private
sector, and has remained high. But from early on governments often found their own
legislated schemes inadequate to achieve their policy objectives and they began to enact
special legislation overriding the existing labor-relations framework, including back-towork laws to end strikes and blanket wage restraints. As well, essential service
designations were expanded to reduce the number of workers legally permitted to strike.
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The use of these devices increased in the 1980s, leading one commentator to characterize
the regime as one of “permanent exceptionalism.” 81
These kinds of legislative interventions have peaked during the free-trade era.
Between 1991 and 1996, 11 of the 15 governments that were in power relied on special
legislation to extend contracts, impose wage cuts or freezes, require workers to take
unpaid leave days, or override job security provisions to facilitate downsizing. 82 Since
1996 back-to-work legislation was used by British Columbia, Newfoundland, Nova
Scotia Quebec, and Saskatchewan to end nurses strikes (in most cases, the government
imposed its offer rather than follow the more usual practice of sending the dispute to
binding arbitration). British Columbia and Alberta also passed back-to-work legislation
to end teachers’ strikes as did the Federal government to end strikes by its blue-collar and
corrections employees. As well, the Federal government suspended interest arbitration in
1997, making strikes the exclusive method of dispute resolution. At the same time, it
greatly expanded the essential service designation, the effect of which was to leave
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employees with no dispute resolution mechanism short of an illegal strike. 83 Rose argues
that in recent years governments have maintained a hard line to better institutionalize the
changes they made during the 1990s. To accomplish this result they have heavily relied
on legislation that restricts the right to strike, puts controls on interest arbitration, and
limits bargaining subjects. Rose concludes, “Governments are not prepared to restore a
genuine collective bargaining system.” 84

b. Passive and Hidden Deregulation?
Trade liberalization has spurred employers to change a range of employment
practices that adversely affect the effectiveness of existing collective bargaining
scheme. 85 These include the use of contingent workers and the outsourcing of work.
Contingent workers are more difficult to organize because they are often less attached to
the workplace and also because their employment status may be uncertain, even after the
extension of the collective bargaining regime to “dependent contractors.” 86 Outsourcing
also puts a large burden on union organizing resources. Successor rights are available in
a rather narrow range of circumstances, so that when a unionized plant contracts work
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out, the union must re-organize the workers who are hired to perform what was
previously bargaining unit work. These are not the only reasons why private sector union
density has declined in Canada during the free trade era by at lest two percentage points
to around eighteen percent, but it is part of the explanation. 87
Flexibilization also has a significant impact on unions’ bargaining power in the
context of a scheme that only requires collective bargaining to occur on a workpace-byworkplace basis. The proliferation of small bargaining units not only increases the costs
of bargaining, but also erodes union bargaining power. The result is that outside of a few
sectors where pattern bargaining has survived, unions have been unable to take wages out
of competition. As well, even within unionized workplaces, there has been a significant
increase in contingent employment. For example, the percentage of newly hired
employees in unionized jobs has grown from nineteen in 1989 to twenty eight in 2004. 88
We will look more closely at the consequences of this development when we discuss
collective bargaining itself as a mechanism of adjustment. Here it is sufficient to note
that the failure to adopt broader-based bargaining schemes or other measures aimed at
redressing the structural misfit between the current law governing bargaining structure
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and changes in the labor market should be considered a form of passive labor market
deregulation.
Turning to administration and enforcement, to my knowledge there is no evidence
that these issues have loomed large as a mechanism of adjustment to trade liberalization
in Canadian collective bargaining law. Canadian labor boards have not altered their
interpretation of their enabling statutes during the free-trade era in a manner that has
further limited the law’s effectiveness. Of course, this is not to say that prior to the freetrade era labor relations boards single-mindedly pursued policies favorable to the growth
and effectiveness of collective bargaining, 89 but rather that there has not been a notable
shift in the compromises embedded in board jurisprudence. Indeed, on at least some
occasions, labor boards have attempted to respond to the challenges posed by employer
resistance to collective bargaining and flexibilization strategies. 90 In Ontario, the
Conservative government threatened the independence of the labour board by changing
long-standing appointment practices, but it suffered legal setbacks and other governments
have not followed suit. 91 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada has been giving labor
boards greater leeway to interpret their enabling statutes in the free-trade period than had
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been the case previously. 92 In short, it would be difficult to claim administrative
practices changed in a manner that undermined the effective of the collective bargaining
scheme. 93

2. Contextual Mediations
a. Internal Adjustments: Bargaining
The extent to which post-World War II Canadian statutory collective bargaining
schemes were ever an effective vehicle for constructing a more democratic regime of
industrial citizenship is a matter of considerable debate. 94 What is significant, however,
is that there is now widespread agreement that the aspirations of those who viewed the
post-war collective bargaining scheme as a mechanism through which a new world of
industrial citizenship could be created have been dashed. Even more to the point, is that
globalization has been identified as one of the crucial reasons for this failure. 95 Thus, at a
92
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macro-level, it is fair to say that the collective bargaining regime has internally adapted to
the broader environment in which it operates.
Turning to the micro-level of adjustment, there are a number of indicators that the
predominant approach of employers has been to use forcing strategies to extract
concessions at the bargaining table, rather than adopting ‘high road’ strategies to increase
productivity through improved conditions, more participation, and greater job security. 96
With respect to wages, the union-nonunion wage differential is estimated to have shrunk
from approximately 25% in the late 1970s to 8% in 1997. Major private sector wage
settlements have decreased from an average of 4.8% between 1982 and 1988 to an
average of 2.6% between 1989 and 2001. There has also been a breakdown of the linkage
between productivity gains and wages increases. For example, between 1992 and 2002,
productivity in manufacturing increased nearly 18% while real hourly wages increased by
just 3.3%. 97 As well, pattern bargaining has been abandoned or disrupted in many
industries. As these data indicate, despite making the protection of wages and benefits
their top priority, unions have had limited success resisting employer demands for labor
cost concessions. 98 Job security and lay-off protection has become the second highest
bargaining priority of unions, but few have succeeded in obtaining substantive limitations
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on contracting out or hiring contingent workers. 99 Moreover, the average number of
strikes per year has declined sharply from 693 between 1982 and 1988 to 409 between
1989 and 2001. 100
The point is not that collective bargaining imposes no restraints on unionized
employers -- unionized employees continue to enjoy a higher level of protection than
non-unionized employees – but rather that in the free-trade era employers have been able
to use the bargaining process as a mechanism of adjustment to the demands of a more
competitive environment. Their ability to make these adjustments has reduced employer
demand for weaker private sector collective bargaining laws.

b. External Constraints
i. Political
Unions in Canada have a long history of political engagement that, in the postWorld War II era, has principally taken the form of support for the NDP. Although the
NDP has never formed or come close to forming the federal government, it has formed
provincial governments in British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Saskatchewan,
including during the free-trade era (British Columbia 1992-2001, Manitoba 1999-present,
Ontario 1990-95, Saskatchewan 1991-present). During each of these periods of NDP
government, private sector collective bargaining laws were modestly strengthened to
meet some union demands. On the other hand, when ideologically conservative
governments have been in power (Ontario 1995-2003, Alberta 1972-present, British
Columbia 2001-present), private-sector collective bargaining laws have been weakened
in response to employer demands. Quebec is a special case where a separatist political
99
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project has provided the foundation upon which to build a limited corporatist entente
through which it has been possible to negotiate labor-management compromise for much
of the 1990s. The election of right-leaning Liberal government in 2003 may result in
private sector industrial relations becoming more contentious. 101
The political orientation of the government in power has also had a significant
impact on public sector labor relations, with governments led by centrist and conservative
parties being far more aggressive in their resort to unilateral legislation to constrain
public sector unions and limit collective bargaining than governments led by parties with
a social democratic orientation. However, even left-of-centre parties have supported
back-to-work legislation and other ‘exceptional’ interventions limiting ‘normal’ operation
of public sector collective bargaining laws. 102

ii. Legal
As noted, hard law constraints may operate at both the international and the
national level. At the international level, two ILO conventions protect freedom of
association, Nos. 87 and 98. Canada ratified the first in 1972 but not the second. It is
generally accepted, though, that all members of the ILO are obliged to protect the right to
freedom of association and this obligation was further advanced in 1998 with the
adoption of the Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work. 103 The
mechanisms for enforcing these obligations, even when nations have ratified the relevant
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conventions, however, are extremely weak, depending largely on monitoring, reporting,
and, ultimately, public pressure. These have proven to have little or no effect on
constraining the actions of Canadian governments, particularly when dealing with public
sector workers. Panitch and Swartz examined complaints made to the ILO for violations
of freedom of association by G-7 countries between 1954 and 2001. During that period a
total of 66 complaints have been filed against Canada, giving it the dubious distinction of
having the most. Notably, 35 of these complaints were filed between 1992 and 2001. 104
The ILO Committee of Freedom of Association has repeatedly noted with regret that
various Canadian governments are violating workers’ freedom of association and
requested that the offending legislation be repealed. These findings and requests have
been ignored. 105
Turning to the NAALC, it will be recalled that its enforcement provisions aim to
prevent deregulation through non-enforcement of domestic law. As such, it does not
purport to operate as a constraint on direct or passive labor market deregulation, although
it could have an indirect effect. Perhaps for this reason Canadian unions have continued
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to funnel the overwhelming majority of their complaints through the ILO rather than
through the NAALC.
Two complaints have been brought against Canada under the NAALC. The first
arose out of the closure of a McDonald’s restaurant in Quebec, allegedly to avoid
unionization. The submitters claimed that McDonald’s exploited loopholes in Quebec’s
labor law that permits employers to delay certification proceedings and then close
facilities to avoid unionization. The American NAO accepted the case for review, but
shortly thereafter an agreement was reached between the submitters and the Quebec
government to include this issue in a review process of the Quebec Labour Code that was
already underway. As a result, the complaint was withdrawn and the file closed. In 2001
administrative changes were made to the Code that accelerated the certification process,
but nothing was done to address plant closings to avoid unionization. 106
The second complaint arose out of a provision in federal legislation that deems
rural route mail couriers not be employees for the purposes of collective bargaining law,
thereby depriving them of access to a statutory collective bargaining scheme. The
American NAO refused to accept this complaint because it did not raise a question
related to the enforcement of law. The rural route mail couriers subsequently achieved
voluntary recognition after a lengthy and expensive organizing drive by the postal
workers’ union. 107
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In short, NAALC has been little used as a mechanism of redress in Canada and its
direct impact has been quite limited. It does not restrict the power of Canadian
governments to pass legislation violating freedom of association and the problem of
government non-enforcement has not loomed large in the collective bargaining regime.
International law norms, hwoever, may have indirect effects, including their
influence on the development of national legal norms. With this in mind, we turn to
domestic legal constraints on labor market regulation, the principal one being the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, which can into force in 1982. The Charter protects freedom of
association but does not define its parameters. Union supporters hoped the courts would
find it protected the right to bargain collectively and to strike, while opponents hoped it
would be found to limit union security clauses. Initially both sides were disappointed as
the Supreme Court of Canada’s refusal to constitutionalize labor rights, including the
right to bargain collective and strike, left the state ample scope to craft its labor relations
policy as it saw fit. 108 A recent trilogy of decisions, however, indicates there has been a
bit of a shift.
In Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General) 109 the court considered a Conservative
government law excluding agricultural workers from the Ontario’s collective bargaining
statute. The law not only deprived agricultural workers of access to a statutory collective
bargaining scheme, but they also lost protection against being discharged or
discriminated against for engaging in organizing activity. In earlier cases, the court had
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held that freedom of association is an individual right and that the state only had to
refrain from barring workers from forming associations. It did not require the state to
positively protect the exercise of that freedom from adverse action by non-governmental
individuals and organizations. 110 In Dunmore the court moderated its earlier position in
two ways. First, it recognized that freedom of association protects some collective rights.
Second, it also found that freedom of association sometimes requires the state to protect
particularly vulnerable workers from private-party interference. In the court held that the
government of Ontario was required to protect agricultural workers against unfair labor
practices and that their associations had the right to make representations on their behalf
to employers. This was thin constitutional protection, indeed, since it did not give them
access to an effective scheme of collective bargaining, and the then conservative Ontario
government responded with legislation that gave agricultural workers the bare minimum
required by the court. This legislation is now being challenged and the court will be
pressed to further constitutionalize collective bargaining rights. 111
One particularly interesting feature of the case is that in reaching its decision the
court relied on international law norms in its interpretation of the Canadian Charter’s
protection of freedom of association. For example, to defend the proposition that
freedom of association was not just an individual right but also a collective one,
Bastarache J, writing for the majority, stated:

The collective dimension of s. 2(d) is also consistent with developments in
international human rights law, as indicated by the jurisprudence of the
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations and the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association
110
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(see, e.g., International Labour Office, Freedom of Association: Digest of
decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the
Governing Body of the ILO (4th ed. 1996)). Not only does this
jurisprudence illustrate the range of activities that may be exercised by a
collectivity of employees, but the International Labour Organization has
repeatedly interpreted the right to organize as a collective right (see
International Labour Office, Voices for Freedom of Association (Labour
Education 1998/3, No. 112): "freedom is not only a human right; it is also,
in the present circumstances, a collective right, a public right of
organisation" (address delivered by Mr. Léon Jouhaux, workers'
delegate)). 112
Further on Bastarche J. returned to international human rights law to justify the court’s
holding that the Charter may prevent the exclusion of vulnerable workers from
legislation protecting the exercise of freedom of association.

The notion that underinclusion can infringe freedom of association is
not only implied by Canadian Charter jurisprudence, but is also consistent
with international human rights law. Article 2 of Convention (No. 87)
concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organize, 67 U.N.T.S. 17, provides that "[w]orkers and employers,
without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and . . . to
join organisations of their own choosing" (emphasis added), and that only
members of the armed forces and the police may be excluded (Article 9).
In addition, Article 10 of Convention No. 87 defines an "organisation" as
"any organisation of workers or of employers for furthering and defending
the interests of workers or of employers" (emphasis added). Canada
ratified Convention No. 87 in 1972. The Convention's broadly worded
provisions confirm precisely what I have discussed above, which is that
discriminatory treatment implicates not only an excluded group's dignity
interest, but also its basic freedom of association. This is further confirmed
by the fact that Article 2 operates not only on the basis of sex, race,
nationality and other traditional grounds of discrimination, but on the basis
of any distinction, including occupational status (see L. Swepston,
"Human rights law and freedom of association: Development through ILO
supervision" (1998), 137 Int'l Lab. Rev. 169, at pp. 179-180). Nowhere is
this clearer than in Article 1 of Convention (No. 11) concerning the Rights
of Association and Combination of Agricultural Workers, 38 U.N.T.S.
153, which obliges ratifying member states to secure to "all those engaged
in agriculture" the same rights of association as to industrial workers; the
convention makes no distinction as to the type of agricultural work
112
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performed. Although provincial jurisdiction has prevented Canada from
ratifying Convention No. 11, together these conventions provide a
normative foundation for prohibiting any form of discrimination in the
protection of trade union freedoms (see J. Hodges-Aeberhard, "The right
to organise in Article 2 of Convention No. 87: What is meant by workers
`without distinction whatsoever'?" (1989), 128 Int'l Lab. Rev. 177). This
foundation is fortified by Convention (No. 141) concerning Organisations
of Rural Workers and Their Role in Economic and Social Development
(I.L.O. Official Bulletin, vol. LVIII, 1975, Series A, No. 1, p. 28) which
extends, under Article 2, the freedom to organize to "any person engaged
in agriculture, handicrafts or a related occupation in a rural area, whether
as a wage earner or, . . . as a tenant, sharecropper or small owneroccupier". 113
This decision illustrates that, not withstanding its weak enforceability, ‘soft’ international
law may influence the development of ‘hard’ domestic constitutional law. Of course,
whether this occurs depends entirely on the predilections of domestic institutions. 114
The Supreme Court also recently considered the legality of secondary picketing
under common law, a dimension of labor law that we have not addressed up to now.
Historically, courts had developed numerous torts to restrict picketing activity and were
particularly hostile to secondary action. Indeed, in the early 1960s the Ontario Court of
Appeal famously found that secondary picketing was per se tortious. 115 Since 1982
unions had challenged a number of restrictions on picketing, claiming that they violated
freedom of expression, but they ran into two major problems. First, in most Canadian
113
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jurisdictions picketing is governed by common law, not statute, and this raised the
question of whether Charter applied to private litigation based on the common law. The
court answered this question in the negative, although it did allow that the common law
should be developed in a manner that was consistent with Charter principles. 116 The
second problem was that where the Charter did apply because there was state action,
restrictions on protected freedoms are permissible if they are demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society. Although the Supreme Court found that picketing was a
protected form of expression, it was not highly valued and in case after case the court
found that restrictions on labor picketing were justified. 117
The Supreme Court abruptly reversed its course in a unanimous judgment in
RWDSU, Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd, 118 in which the court
held that secondary picketing was legal at common law unless it involves conduct that is
independently tortious or criminal. This was the first time that court modified the
common law in order to make it conform to Charter values. Moreover, in reaching its
decision, the court expressed a far more positive view of the expressive value of
picketing than it had in the past. Of course, this decision still leaves in place all the
economic torts, such as inducing breach of contract and civil conspiracy to injure, that
provide a basis for limiting secondary activity, but it indicates some willingness by the
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Supreme Court to use constitutional norms to expand the scope of legally permissible
collective action. 119
The third case raised a question about the constitutionality of union security
provisions, particularly whether mandatory union membership violated freedom of
association. The claim hinges on a finding that freedom of association also protects
individuals from forced association and that various forms of union security bring people
into involuntary association. The court has been badly split on these issues and this was
evident in its most recent decision, R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring, which produced five
separate judgments. 120 A large majority of the court endorsed the proposition that
freedom of association does encompass a negative right from forced association, but only
a bare majority found that a mandatory membership provision in a Quebec statute
governing collective bargaining in construction violated that guarantee. In their view,
compulsory membership in a union amounted to a form of ideological coercion, even in
the absence of any evidence that the union coerced members to accept the views it
espoused. In the result, however, a bare majority of the justices upheld the law: one was
of the view that there was no negative dimension to freedom of association; three rejected
the claim that compulsory union membership violated the negative right; and one thought
the violation was demonstrably justified because of the severity of the labor relations
problems in the Quebec construction industry. Thus, while this law survived the
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challenge, the court’s decision provides ammunition for future challenges to union
security clauses and the use of union dues for political activity. 121
In sum, then, law has operated, in a limited way, to constrain downward pressure
on collective bargaining schemes. While international law does not impose any
enforceable limits on state action, its norms have influenced the Supreme Court of
Canada’s interpretation of domestic constitutional law, and led the court to strike down
the Conservative government’s legislation depriving agricultural workers of any
protection or support for associational activities. The court has also used Charter values
to roll back slightly common law restrictions on secondary action. Whether it will further
constitutionalize the right to bargain collectively or to strike, however, remains to be
seen. At the same time, the court has also indicated its concern to protect individuals
against compelled associations.

iii. Ideological/Civil Society
An assessment of the extent to which Canadian governments are constrained from
deregulating labor markets generally and weakening collective bargaining regimes in
particular by popular beliefs and civil society activism is inherently difficult. In part, the
election of social democratic governments in a number of provinces speaks in a general
way to the level of popular discontent with the social dislocations and growing inequality
that are associated with the combination of trade liberalization and neo-liberal domestic
politics, but our focus here is on the extra-parliamentary activities of labor and social
movements, particularly as they relate to the collective bargaining regime.
121
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At a national and provincial level, regressive labor legislation has often been met
by large mobilizations of unions and social movements. In Ontario, for example, the
labor movement launched a series of one-day municipal-wide general strikes in response
to the Conservative government’s labor law reforms. Social movements joined the cause,
bringing in their concerns about other government policies, producing unprecedented
displays of solidarity. In Toronto, nearly a million people took to the streets. Yet the
movement fizzled, in part because of internal tensions between public and private sector
unions. 122 In subsequent years two massive public sector strikes, one a legal strike by
provincial government employees, the other an illegal province-wide strike by Ontario
teachers opposed to legislation that, inter alia, weakened their collective bargaining
rights, also attracted widespread public support, but did little to deter the government
from pursuing its agenda, although it may have moderated the use of legal coercion
against the strikers. 123
Trade liberalization and the growing economic integration of Canada, the United
States, and Mexico has encouraged the development of transnational union and social
movement activism. For example, it has been suggested that the greatest contribution of
the NAALC complaint process is not the case results, but the deepening of ties between
national labor movements. 124 Yet despite the growth of this activism, it would be
difficult to argue that it has exercised a constraining force on the Canadian state. In large
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measure, this is because activists have not targeted Canada. Rather, transnational
activism has aimed at labor market regulation and enforcement in Mexico and other less
developed countries, the labor practices of multinational corporations and their
contractors, and developments in the laws and institutions governing international trade.
To the extent that cross-border resistance is successful, this relieves some of the pressures
that may otherwise promote Canadian labor market deregulation, but its effects are quite
indirect.

3. Conclusion
The trajectory of Canadian labor law has not been as even-keeled as the new
consensus supporters have argued. While it is true that private sector labor laws have
ebbed and flowed over the past fifteen years, depending on the party in power, it is
arguable that the negative effects of certification procedure changes have outweighed the
positive effects of more union-friendly amendments. This is reflected in the decline in
union density during the free-trade era. The inclusion of public sector collective
bargaining legislation shifts the trajectory of labor law change in a sharply downward
direction, as governments across Canada have unilaterally acted to curb collective
bargaining by public and para-public sector employees. The picture becomes even
bleaker if we expand our focus to the effectiveness of labor market regulation, taking into
account passive deregulation. The Canadian labor market has changed substantially over
the past fifteen years, changes accelerated by trade liberalization. Collective bargaining
legislation has not responded to the challenges posed by work restructuring, even when
left-center parties have been in power. Administrative or disguised deregulation has not
loomed large
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Yet, it is also the case that the downward trajectory of collective bargaining law
has not been as steep as many free-trade critics predicted. This is because of internal
accommodations and external restraints. Internal accommodation is built into free
collective bargaining, which is designed to be responsive to changes in bargaining power.
The maco-level role of collective bargaining as promoter of industrial democracy has
largely yielded to its more limited bargaining role, but in a context in which union
bargaining power has been eroded. As a result, unionized employers have been able to
implement flexibilization and cost-cutting strategies, albeit not without resistance. For
those who view collective bargaining as a mechanism for protecting labor standards this
is not good news, but it does help explain why the pressure for legal deregulation may
have been blunted. Indeed, it is arguable that because market discipline does not operate
as effectively on the public sector that governments have been more inclined to use
legislation to achieve their objectives. External influences, however, have exerted some
moderating pressure. In particular, there is considerable political support for parties that
articulate an alternative to the neo-liberal vision of a world governed by market forces.
Where left-center parties are elected, the private sector collective bargaining regime has
been sustained and there is somewhat less frequent resort to coercive legislation in the
public sector. International and domestic constitutional law have exerted a weak,
moderating effect, most clearly exhibited in the Dunmore decision imposing a positive
obligation on the state to protect the exercise of freedom of association for vulnerable
workers. Finally, while there have been major civil society mobilizations to oppose trade
liberalization, and sporadic mass demonstrations against anti-union labor legislation, its
restraining effects have been limited.
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B. United States
1. Trajectory of Labor Market Regulation
a. Legislative Change
i. Private Sector
The most notable characteristic of American private collective bargaining
legislation is that it has not changed in any major respect since at least 1959 and that its
basic text dates from 1935 and 1947. 125 Legislative inaction is not the result of a lack of
effort, largely on the part of unions, to amend the law. Rather, it is primarily caused by
organized employers mobilizing enough support in Congress to block any amendment
proposed by labor. Clearly, employer opposition to union-sponsored labor law reform
predates NAFTA, so it cannot be said that legislative inertia is one of NAFTA’s effects,
although it is fair to surmise that in the post-NAFTA environment employers’ resolve to
resist labor law reforms, such as a prohibition on the permanent replacement of striking
workers, has only been strengthened. 126 Therefore, an assessment of NAFTA’s impact
on the effectiveness of private sector collective bargaining must shift to passive and
administrative forms of deregulation.

ii. Public Sector Collective Bargaining
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Jurisdictional arrangements over public sector bargaining in the U.S. are
extremely decentralized. As a result, collective bargaining rights are “a crazy-quilt
patchwork of state and local laws, regulations, executive orders, court decisions, and
attorney general opinions.” 127 Like in Canada, public sector collective bargaining laws
were first passed in the 1960s and were adapted from the private sector model, subject to
a variety of limitations regarding the scope of bargaining and dispute resolution.
Unionization in the public sector spread rapidly and union density rose sharply as private
sector density fell.
Because of its decentralized character, public sector labor law is much more
responsive to changes in the political orientation of the government in power. As a
result, changes in public sector labor law have been diverse, making it difficult to identify
an overall trend. Belman et al, argue that public sector collective bargaining has moved
from a period of maturation to one of transition, and that its future direction will be
shaped by two competing strategies, one involving a best practices approach, the other
cost-cutting and downsizing. 128 In the former scenario, public sector collective
bargaining may fare well, while in the later it is likely to be restrained.
Federal government labor law provides a good example of how shifting political
fortunes influence the direction of change. The Clinton administration issued Executive
Order 12871 in 1993. It aimed to improve government efficiency through partnership
arrangements with its unionized employees. Under this regime, union membership and
127
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density increased in the federal public service. The Bush administration was opposed to
working with unions and repealed EO 12871. As well, his administration sought and
gained the power to exclude unions from agencies handling public security issues. As a
result, in recent years federal sector union density has been declining. 129
At the state level, the picture is quite mixed. As of 2002 there were 27 states that
did not have public sector collective bargaining laws, although provision existed in some
of those states for collective bargaining under local ordinances or executive orders. This
is largely unchanged from the situation in 1987. 130 Collective bargaining rights were
extended to public sector workers in a number of states by executive order (eg. Maryland
and Kentucky), but in at least one state, Indiana, the public sector collective bargaining
scheme was terminated by executive order. 131 Belman et al. conclude that “the
pronounced trend since 1987 has been toward circumscription of bargaining and toward
support for unilateral action by government” 132 but it would appear that the retrenchment
in the US is not as severe as it has been in Canada.

b. Passive and Administrative Deregulation
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The real story of private sector American labor law is not that it has been stripped
down by legislative change (at least not since 1959), but rather that it has been rendered
ineffective in promoting collective bargaining or even in protecting basic worker rights to
freedom of association. The process of erosion, however, was already well advanced
long before NAFTA. Private sector union density hovered around the 30 percent range
until about 1970, when it began dropping sharply. Thus, when Paul Weiler published his
well-known piece documenting the failings of the Wagner Act in 1983, he was looking
back over a decade in which private sector density had dropped to about 20 percent in
1980. Private sector union density has continued to decline and since the beginning of
the free trade era it has shrunk another 25 percent, falling below 9 percent in in 2002. 133
There is a great debate over the causes of this decline and whether and to what
extent it is attributable to the deficiencies of collective bargaining law and its
administration, particularly in the face of growing employer resistance to unionization. It
is beyond the scope of this article to review that literature, but there seems to be fairly
compelling evidence that law does matter and that its failings explain some significant
part of in the decline of private sector unions. 134 In particular, the US system of drawnout certification elections and the lack of adequate protection against unfair labor
practices have been noted as major impediments to successful organizing drives in the
face of employer hostility, while the grant of legal authority to employers to hire
permanent strike replacements and the restriction on unions from engaging in secondary
133
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action have been identified as major causes of weakened union bargaining power. 135
These shortcomings are, in part, embedded in statute’s text, but they are also the product
of decades of administrative and judicial decision-making. 136 Thus, in the U.S. context,
it is perhaps artificial to distinguish between passive and administrative deregulation.
This is not to say that the NLRB and the courts are relentlessly anti-union in their
decision-making. The NLRB has become far more politicized than Canadian labor
relations boards and thus there are much greater shifts in decision-making when a new
administration takes office. 137 For example, the current Bush board has been accused of
exhibiting a strong employer bias in recent decisions that have, inter alia, overruled
Clinton board decisions that facilitated bargaining by graduate teaching assistants and
contingent workers. 138 Courts, too, have shifted over time in their review of NLRB
decision-making, but for many years they have tended to give priority to individual rights
over the promotion and preservation of collective bargaining relationships. 139 The
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general picture that emerges is one of a regime that has become sclerotic through a
combination of statutory gridlock, the weight of past decisions, and judicial
constraints. 140
If American labor law was already ineffective at the beginning of the free-trade
era, changes in the labor market since then have only exacerbated the problem. Much of
the success of the US labor movement was premised on its ability to take wages out of
competition by, in effect, organizing entire industries. As free trade agreements unleash
competitive forces, and governments deregulate sectors of the economy like inter-state
trucking and airlines, unions can no longer sustain that position, with the result that
unionized employers often find themselves at a competitive disadvantage. 141 The result,
as Stone notes, is that “As firms find themselves in a more competitive environment
through increased trade and global competition, they have to pay more attention to shortterm cost reduction.” 142 For non-union firms, union avoidance looms as an even higher
priority than it did previously. According to a study of union certification campaigns in
1998 and 1999, more than half the targeted employers threatened to move or shut-down
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operations in response to union activity. 143 Growing competitive pressure has also
promoted reliance on flexibilization strategies, including outsourcing and the growth of
contingent and precarious employment, 144 all of which undermine the effectiveness of
collective bargaining law which was constructed on the norm of the standard employment
relation that offered workers long-term, reasonably secure employment with a large
employer. The new labor market places enormous demands on unions to continuously
organize new and small bargaining units, often populated by contingent and precarious
workers whose employment status may be uncertain, and to negotiate collective
agreements with small firms operating in highly competitive environments. 145 Thus,
while a number of scholars have found that trade liberalization is not a major direct cause
of deunionization, they have argued that its indirect effects are significant. 146
In short, it is hardly a cause for celebration to say that the rights of U.S. workers
under its private sector collective bargaining laws have not been eroded by legislative
change during the free-trade era. The effectiveness of U.S. labor law was already close to
the proverbial bottom prior to the free-trade era, so it is not surprising that employers
143
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have not pursued labor law reform as a means of adjustment to the pressures of
globalization. Rather, their lobbying energies have been directed at blocking unionsponsored labor law reforms that would respond to the well-documented inability of the
scheme to promote collective bargaining and protect freedom of association in today’s
labor market. The growing mismatch between the legal regime and the world of work
that it is intended to regulate justifies characterizing what has happened as a case of
passive and administrative deregulation par excellence.

2. Contextual Mediations
a. Bargaining
While it has been argued that the Wagner Act was conceived as an ambitious
attempt to construct a more democratic and cooperative workplace, there is little dispute
that, at best, American collective bargaining has become a vehicle through which unions
and employers negotiate work rules, wages, and benefits. This occurred well before the
free trade era, so our focus here will be on collective bargaining outcomes. 147
As in Canada, a number of indicators suggest that employers have used the
collective bargaining process to extract concessions. Recent data indicate that although
unionized workers still make more than their non-union counterparts, the wage
differential has narrowed. During the period from 1991 to 2000 the wages of non-union
147
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workers increased faster than those of unionized workers. 148 The linkage between
productivity gains and union wage increases has been broken as capital is extracting a
larger share of productivity growth. 149 Work stoppages are becoming less frequent. For
example, in 1989 there were 51 strikes idling 1,000 or more workers, but only 15 in
2004. 150 These data suggest that employers are taking economic advantage of unions’
declining bargaining power.
We also need to consider the extent to which collective bargaining has
accommodated work restructuring within unionized firms. According to one survey, in
1999 new work flexibility arrangements were achieved in one-third to one-half of
negotiations, while new job security provisions were made in one-tenth to one-quarter of
collective agreements. Even more troubling was that less than ten percent of respondents
reported that they had somewhat or very cooperative relations and that their relationship
was improving. 151 The picture that emerges from this study is that while innovative
contract language is being negotiated, this is often the result of management forcing its
agenda onto the union without providing workers with the job security or wage increases
that they seek. The result is adjustment, but of an imbalanced, not a progressive, kind;
the product of changing power relations more than the negotiation of mutual gains along
the high road.

148

Ann C. Foster, “Differences in Union and Nonunion Earnings in Blue-collar and

Service Occupations” (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, June 25, 2003)
online at http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/cm20030623ar01p1.htm.
149

Mishel et al., State of Working America, 86-94, 156-58.

150

Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Series WSU 100.

151

Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Kochan, “Taking Stock,” 9-10, 22.

72

b. External Constraints
i. Political Constraints
Unlike in Canada, where governments have regularly modified collective
bargaining legislation to make it better accord with its political orientation, in the U.S.
private sector collective bargaining law has been frozen. Deregulation of collective
bargaining has not occurred through direct legislative action, but rather has been passive
and administrative. The political problem, therefore, has not been to block legislative
deregulation, but to reverse the downward trajectory of the regime through remedial
legislation. This has been beyond the means of the American labor movement.
In part, this is because the federal government must amend private sector
collective bargaining. This deprives the union movement of the opportunity to have
changes made in those states where it has greater influence. As well, social-democratic
parties have no presence on the American political scene and the labor movement has
traditionally channeled its political energies into support for the Democratic Party. Yet
even during Democratic administrations, the labor movement has been unable to get any
part of its collective bargaining reform agenda passed. The strength of employer
resistance to unionization in their own firms is carried over into the political arena, where
employers are firmly united in their opposition to any law reform that might make the
collective bargaining regime more effective. In these circumstances, there is little
prospect that in the foreseeable future a weakened labor movement will be able to
mobilize the political resources necessary to get any part of its reform agenda enacted
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into law. 152 In sum, electoral politics have not acted as a brake on the deterioration of the
U.S. private sector collective bargaining regime.

ii. Legal
International law has had even less influence in the United States than in Canada.
Although the United States has not ratified either of the ILO’s core conventions
respecting freedom of association (Conventions 87 and 98), it supported the ILO
Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which includes freedom of
association. As well, member countries are bound to respect the principles of
conventions 87 and 98 even if they have not ratified them. and the United States has
accepted the jurisdiction of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) to
review complaints filed against it, even though it is not subject to the fuller review
process that applies to countries that have ratified these conventions.
While the U.S. accepts these international rights in principle, it feels free to depart
from them in practice. In 1990 the CFA upheld two complaints against the U.S., one
challenging the right of employers to hire permanent replacements for striking workers
and the other challenging state laws prohibiting public sector unionization and collective
bargaining. The government took no action to bring its laws into compliance with ILO
standards. Since then US trade unionists have not brought any further complaints. 153
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The NAALC has also had little impact on American labor law. To date, eight
complaints have been filed against the U.S., seven with the Mexican NAO and one with
the Canadian. Six of these related to freedom of association. The first was launched in
1995 and involved the closure of a Sprint plant, allegedly to avoid unionization.
Ministerial consultations produced an agreement to keep the Mexican Secretary of Labor
informed of the legal proceedings underway in the United States, to instruct the NAALC
secretariat to study the effects of sudden plant closures on freedom of association, and to
hold a public forum in San Francisco, the site of the closure. In December 1996 the
NLRB ruled that the plant closing was motivated by anti-union animus, but the United
States Court of Appeal overturned decision in November 1997. The NAALC
secretariat’s report, issued in April 1997, found that threats of plant closing to resist union
organizing efforts were widespread in the United States but less prevalent in Canada and
Mexico. 154
Four complaints were filed in 1998, three of which raised freedom of association
issues. 155 All three were resolved by the signing of a ministerial agreement that included
an undertaking to hold a government-to-government meeting to discuss the application of
US law in the areas raised by the submission. As well, public outreach and education
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sessions were organized in two of the localities where the alleged violations occurred to
inform the public of the workers’ legal rights. In 1999 the Canadian NAO declined to
accept a submission alleging violations of the NLRA and in 2003 the Mexican NAO
accepted a submission alleging violations of numerous workers’ rights, including
freedom of association. 156
The results of the complaints process have been disappointing, to say the least.
As one commentator noted, “up to now all cases have ended with ministerial
consultations and the joint agreement of action programmes that have not produced
visible changes in the legal practices of the countries concerned.” 157 In part this is a
function of the NAALC’s design, since complaints about freedom of association,
collective bargaining and the right to strike cannot go past the first stage of ministerial
consultations. The result is that disputes are resolved at the political level in a context in
which no government has an interest in pursuing high intensity conflict strategies. 158 Not
surprisingly, activists are losing interest in using the NAALC and few new submissions
are being filed.
This still leaves open the possibility that international labor and human rights
norms exert an indirect influence through domestic constitutional and common law, as
we saw in Canada. This has not been the case in the US. The US constitution does not
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protect freedom of association as such, and so attempts to ground labor rights in the
constitution have had to point to other protected rights. None of these avenues have
provided a basis for constitutionalizing labor rights. Indeed, opponents of collective
labor rights have had more success invoking constitutional protection for the right of
individuals to refrain from compelled association. 159 As well, international labor and
human rights norms have not influenced the courts’ constitutional interpretations in this
area, or in others 160 and there is also no indication that US courts are likely to exercise
their powers of statutory interpretation or develop the common law in ways that would
better protect workers’ freedom of association. In sum, neither international nor domestic
law has operated as an external constraint on the decline of the collective bargaining
regime.

iii. Civil Society Restraints
As noted in our discussion of Canada, it is inherently difficult to assess the extent
to which governments are constrained by popular beliefs and social movement activism.
On the domestic front, the labor movement, in coalition with other social movements, has
scored some successes in their opposition to the free-trade agenda. It vigorously opposed
NAFTA, and was largely responsible for creating a political environment in which thencandidate Clinton felt constrained to make his support for NAFTA conditional on the
negotiation of a side accord protecting labor and the environment. As well, in the fall of
1997 and in 1998, the labor movement successfully lobbied to block the grant of fast159
160
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track trade negotiation authority to Clinton. 161 The labor movement also played a key
role in organizing the protests at the WTO meetings in Seattle that led Clinton to float the
idea of linking trade to labor rights. Those successes, however, were short-lived. In
2000 the House approved a trade deal with China and in 2002 President Bush was
granted fast-track authority, albeit with a provision that allows labor and environmental
issues to be addressed in the agreement. This has taken the form of NAALC-type
provisions that express a principled commitment of the parties to core labor standards,
but only requires each party to enforce its existing laws while excusing weaknesses due
to reasonable exercises of discretionary power and bona fide decisions regarding the
allocation of resources. 162
While these efforts aim to protect American labor from ‘unfair’ competition, they
do so in a way that is oriented toward addressing poor conditions outside of the country.
They do not address directly the declining efficacy of the US labor law regime. In large
part, this is because the labor movement recognizes that labor law reform is not
achievable under current conditions. Therefore, it has set about trying to rebuild itself
organizationally, often through the use of tactics that by-pass the NLRA framework.
This brand of social movement unionism has produced some notable successes, but has
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yet to reverse the decline in private sector unionism. 163 Absent such revitalization, there
is little prospect that unions acting in concert with other social movements will be able
effectively to constrain the pressures undermining the efficacy of American labor law.
Transnational activism, as we noted in our discussion of Canada, has developed,
in part stimulated by the NAALC complaints mechanism, which encourages transnational
collaboration. The U.S.-Mexican border has been the site of much of this activity. 164 Its
primary focus, however, has been on Mexican labor practices, or, if we go beyond the
NAFTA framework, labor practices in the undeveloped world, rather than in the US.
This is not intended as a criticism, but merely as an observation in support of a simple
point: transnational civil society activism exerts no pressure on the US government to
staunch the erosion of its collective bargaining regime.

3. Conclusion
An assessment of the trajectory of US collective bargaining law must start from
the fact of its weakened state at the beginning of the free-trade era. It might be said that
because it started closer to the bottom, it would not be as strongly affected by regulatory
competition as Canada, the jurisdiction with higher labor standards. There is indeed an
element of truth to this; US employers have not made any significant effort to amend the
NLRA in the free-trade era. However, the lack of legislative change does not establish
that the collective bargaining regime’s efficacy is unaffected by globalization. While
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U.S. collective bargaining law has not been racing downwards, increased global
competitiveness has changed the labor market in ways that are antithetical to its ability to
promote collective bargaining and protect workers’ freedom of association. The growing
mismatch between law and the social reality in which it operates produces greater
regulatory failure. Public sector collective bargaining has also been adversely affected by
the adoption of neo-liberal policies that are associated with the competitiveness agenda,
but retrenchment does not seem to be as severe in the U.S. as it has been in Canada.
The impact of liberalized trade on collective bargaining law, however, is mediated
by internal and external factors. Internally, the collective bargaining process has
accommodated employer-initiated demands for concessions and greater flexibility,
although it would take further study would to determine whether Canadian unions have
been more successful at protecting their members than their U.S. counterparts.
Externally, political constraints have operated to prevent enactment of the remedial
legislation required to slow or reverse its erosion through what can best be characterized
as malign neglect. As well, international law has little or no influence on the direction of
U.S. labor law, and there seems little prospect that courts will constitutionalize labor
rights or otherwise protect them through their power to interpret statutes and develop the
common law. Finally, civil society activism in the labor rights area is largely directed
outwards, rather than inwards on domestic labor policy.

IV. Conclusion: Have Great Expectations Been Defeated?
If the great expectation was that NAFTA would produce dramatic and significant
legislative erosion of collective bargaining laws, then it is fair to say that that expectation
has been partially defeated. In the U.S. the NLRA has not been amended during the free-
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trade era, and, to the extent that it is possible to discern a trend, public sector collective
bargaining law has suffered relatively modest setbacks. The expectation of erosion was
stronger for Canada, the jurisdiction with the higher labor standards, and while there has
not been a race to the bottom in labor legislation, there has been deterioration. While
private sector collective bargaining laws have been both strengthened and weakened at
different times and in different places, the most significant trend has been the elimination
of card-check certifications in a many jurisdictions, including Ontario and British
Columbia. As numerous studies have shown, this change is likely to have a significant
and negative impact on trade union density. Moreover, if we expand our focus to include
public sector collective bargaining, we find the level of legislative erosion even greater as
the frequency with which Canadian governments override or reduce existing collective
bargaining rights has increased in the past decade.
The extent of defeated expectations is even less if we shift our focus from
legislation to regulatory effectiveness. U.S. collective bargaining law was notoriously
ineffective going into the free-trade era and has only become more so as trade-linked
changes to the labor market have created an environment that is even more inimical to the
creation and perpetuation of collective bargaining relationships. A similar situation
prevails in Canada, although it is moderated somewhat by stronger and better-enforced
labor rights.
This partial vindication of the predictions of Model 1 still leaves us with the need
to explain why great expectations were partially defeated. The contextual variables
introduced by Model 2 led us to examine factors internal to the system of collective
bargaining and ones external to it. Collective bargaining is itself a mechanism of
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adjustment that accommodates changing goals and objectives that are either in the mutual
interest of the parties or are backed by one party’s superior bargaining power. In both
Canada and the United States there is evidence that both these kinds of accommodation
are occurring, largely in response to employer initiatives aimed at cutting labor costs and
increasing productivity. While in some cases this results in labor-management
cooperation and mutual gains, the evidence suggests that the more frequent from of
accommodation involves labor concessions to management demands. While some might
characterize this outcome as a regulatory failure, I have treated it as accommodation
within the system on the ground that private sector collective bargaining regimes in both
countries were intended to be responsive to changing economic and labor market
conditions.
Differences between Canada and the United States are, perhaps, most marked in
relation to the influence of external factors. Because labor law in Canada is provincial
rather than national, it has been more sensitive to local swings in political strength and
hence labor law reform has been more volatile. Conservative governments have taken
steps to ‘Americanize’ labor laws, particularly in the important area of certification
procedures, but NDP and most Liberal governments (BC is an exception) have resisted
that pressure and, indeed, have often passed legislation that moderately strengthens the
private sector collective bargaining regime. They have been less charitable when it
comes to their own workers. In the US, there is little prospect that in the foreseeable
future labor will be able to muster political support for long-needed reforms.
International or transnational legal regimes are ineffective in directly countering
downward pressure on collective bargaining law in both Canada and the U.S. However,
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the Supreme Court of Canada has chosen to take international law seriously and use it as
a point of reference in its interpretation of Canadian constitutional law. Depending on
how far they go, this approach could lead to a constitutionalization of some parts of the
collective bargaining regime, possibly including the right to have effective access to a
statutory bargain collectively scheme. As well, the court has recently identified trade
unions as socially desirable institutions whose activities, like picketing, are worthy of
constitutional protection. There is little prospect that American courts will protect labor
rights to the same extent.
Finally, social movements in both countries have been active in opposing
globalization and neo-liberal restructuring, although it is arguably the case that protest
actions aimed at regressive private sector labor law reforms and interference with public
sector workers’ collective bargaining rights have been stronger in Canada than in the U.S.
Yet, social movement mobilizations or their threat do not seem to have had much effect
on domestic collective bargaining policy. Social movements, however, have scored some
success in getting social and labor issues onto the table in international trade talks and in
pressuring transnational corporations to take some steps monitor labor conditions in their
overseas supply networks.
In sum, this study supports the view that free-trade agreements create
conditioning frameworks that generate downward economic and institutional pressures
on the effectiveness of collective bargaining laws. These pressures will also operate in
the collective bargaining process itself, often yielding poorer outcomes for unionized
workers. More optimistically, our study shows there are avenues for resistance,
notwithstanding the attempt through free trade agreements to impose on politics, law and
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social movements the discipline of market forces. In Canada, law , at least temporarily,
has proven to be more resistant to those disciplinary forces than many would have
anticipated, but it would be a dangerous strategy to rely exclusively on the vagaries of
judicial decision-making to resist the growing commodification of labor. The task of
successfully organizing political and social movement resistance, however, is a daunting
one.
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